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The Grassfields in History 
 
Chilver and Kaberry brought to light the complexities of the societies of the 
Grassfields of Cameroon. These comprise a multiplicity of political communities 
predicated on heavily stressed linguistic singularity, varying modes (and extent) of 
centralisation of powers and the seemingly idiosyncratic parcelling up in individual 
polities of elements from a common core of cultural forms and practices. While not 
unique, this multiplicity of fiercely independent and linguistically distinct groupings 
is clearly distinct from other broader and more homogeneous ethnic blocks such as 
the Yoruba or even the Tikar (see below) from whom, paradoxically, many 
Grassfields dynasties claim origins.  
 
The political and linguistic diversity of Grassfields societies is susceptible to differing 
interpretations. If the word ‘fragmentation’ were substituted for that of ‘diversity’ in 
the sentence above, we might be led to consider the Grassfields as an example of a 
‘shatter belt’ phenomenon. In other words, as some formerly more homogeneous 
entity that has been fragmented into the great multiplicity of sets observed by the first 
European travellers to the Grassfields in the late nineteenth century. This is a negative 
view of Grassfields society and history. It is paralleled by a negative linguistic view 
of small language populations in the Grassfields as instances of language death or 
decline.  
 
Explicitly ‘negative’ views of the diversity of sets and multiplicity of languages in the 
Grassfields are exemplified in the recent historical works of Eldridge Mohammadou 
(1990 and 1991) and the earlier work of the anthropologist Jean-Pierre Warnier 
(1984). In their studies a picture emerges of a hammer-blow from the north, in the 
shape of mounted raiders sweeping in and shattering a homogeneous and politically 
relatively uncentralised population. The historically attested incursions of Chamba 
(Jeffreys, 1962), and later Fulani raiders are taken to have disrupted local organisation 
leading to compaction of mixed groups in defensible positions and increasing political 
centralisation. We examine Eldridge Mohammadou’s development of these ideas 
below in a discussion of the Tikar origins claimed at one point in time by certain 
Grassfields groups.  
 
That mounted raiders penetrated the Grassfields in the nineteenth century is 
undeniable, but the actual forms of Chamba and Fulani activity were very different 
indeed, and moreover, the nature of their respective impacts susceptible to conflicting 
interpretations (Fardon, 1988). There is no space to go into this in detail here, but in 
principle the Chamba incursions did lead to permanent settlements in the heart of the 
Grassfields while Fulani returned whence they came. However, it is important to 
stress that the largest of the Chamba successor states in the Grassfields, Bali-Nyonga, 
is highly composite, includes non-Chamba elements from within and beyond the 
Grassfields, and presently speaks Mungakka, a Grassfield language (Chilver, 1967). 
The smaller, less powerful Chamba successor states, notably Bali-Kumbad and its 
small neighbours the Bali-Gashu and Bali-Gangsin, retain their Chamba-Leko dialect. 
In this there is an indication that the Grassfields have, in many ways, assimilated the 
Chamba; and further that the greater the degree of this assimilation the more 
successful the Chamba successor state, especially the Bali-Nyonga, has proved to be. 
(See Fardon [below] and Pradelles [1995] for further discussion).  
 
Later Fulani raids were not associated with settlement. The pastoral Fulani only 
arrived in the first decades of the twentieth century (Chilver, 1989). Fulani raids 
seriously disorganised northern groups but their greatest influence was on Bamum in 
the later part of the nineteenth century. Between 1895 and 1897 forces from Banyo 
were sent to support the young king Njoya against a palace revolt led by the retainer 
Gbetnkom (see Tardits below for a discussion of wider Fulani influence on Bamum). 
This example of Grassfields elements inviting mounted military forces from the north 
to support local factions competing for power represents an alternative and more 
positive view of Grassfields history and relationships with the exterior. Indeed, rather 
than seeing the multiplicity of political sets and languages of the Grassfields as an 
outcome of processes of fragmentation by external forces, we can offer an alternative 
and more positive view.  
 
When the Germans arrived in the Grassfields in the late nineteenth century they 
perceived it to be a distinct region. They made this judgement on the basis of the 
material culture, architecture and political forms they encountered. The region was 
not culturally homogeneous but it was perceptibly different both from its southern 
forest neighbours and from northern groups on the Adamawa Plateau. The kinds of 
groupings that the Germans found included individual chiefdoms ranging in size from 
200 to 60,000, often physically bounded by large-scale earthworks and fixed in 
dynastic time by lengthy chief-lists.  
 
The Germans encountered chiefs, palaces, elaborate forms of retainerdom and secret 
male associations with political functions. Nonetheless, these communities varied 
considerably in the degree of centralisation of political powers, which correlated 
inversely with population density so that the largest and most centralised polity, 
Bamum, had lowest densities whereas groups such as the Meta’ or Moghamo on the 
western margins of the Bamenda Grassfields, described in the literature as acephalous 
(and in some oral traditions as slave-marches) had the highest densities of all 
(Warnier, 1985). Patrilineal succession and virilocal marriage, large compound units 
with sons, brothers and their wives were predominant. However, a large section of the 
Bamenda Grassfields practised matrilineal succession. Put in these terms it hardly 
sounds like a region that was culturally, politically or socially homogeneous. Indeed, 
when it comes to economic activity the diversity is even more striking, with locally 
specialised production of a wide range of craft and agricultural products apparently 
unconstrained by ecological factors.  
 
Whence then a distinctively Grassfields character given all this diversity? It is clear 
from early German written material and photographic records that the Germans were 
very much taken with the material culture of the region they called the Grasland. 
Christraud Geary presents astonishing accounts of German collecting activity at the 
beginning of this century when ‘booty’ was sent home in the form of masks, stools, 
thrones, et cetera in order to win a medal from the Kaiser (1988: 85-6) . Indeed, it is 
precisely in these material realms, of domestic architecture, carved portals, masks, 
iron-ware, decorated cloth and beadwork that things, people and places become 
distinctively Grasland. Materials, objects and skills were the substance of an intense 
system of exchanges that served to negotiate status between individual descent-group 
heads and between communities and chiefs. Hence, no one is innately Grassfields; 
rather, one becomes more or less Grassfields relative to one’s position in the regional 
structure of exchanges and the opportunities that this presents.  
 
This pattern of economic specialisation upon which participation in exchange 
networks was based is distinctive of the region. Jean-Pierre Warnier (1985) represents 
this pattern in abstract as a series of concentric rings. On the periphery is a 
surrounding belt of palm-oil production, then an inner ring of cereal and agricultural 
production associated with entrepreneurial trading houses. Finally, a central zone 
characterised by production of high-value low-unit-volume commodities, such as fine 
ceramic-ware and wood carvings, woven caps and decorated raffia-work, and a great 
deal of iron-ware. Physical - topographic, edaphic and climatic - factors do not 
account for this regional specialisation. We may, as Warnier does, adduce Ricardian 
notions of comparative cost advantage - we may point out the apparent ordering of 
production according to relative transportation costs - but there is no reason to expect 
that the conditions that brought this pattern of economic specialisation into being 
should necessarily survive its continued existence.  
 
Central to all of this is the nature of control by male seniors over access to women, 
prestige, ancestral favour and other mystical sources of power; for instance, at the 
centre of the Grassfields in the Ndop Plain. At the end of the nineteenth century, with 
very few exceptions, all the necessary materials - palm-oil, salt, cowries, camwood, et 
cetera - which a junior male required to progress through society to social adulthood 
through participation in recreational and political associations, marriage, et cetera - 
were not produced locally, and were obtainable only through regional trade networks 
(Fowler, 1990). These networks were jealously guarded by senior males. In order for 
juniors to get anywhere it was necessary for them to contribute raw materials and 
labour to seniors in the specialised production of local commodities. The advantages 
to senior males in this scenario are clear, and it is interesting to note that this goes 
hand-in-hand with an extraordinary degree of economic control exercised by the 
secret male political associations linked to the palaces of Grassfields chiefs (Warnier, 
1985).  
 
Harter (1986) has argued that specialisation in the production of high-value objects at 
the centre of the Grassfields is an outcome of economic necessity: i.e., since they had 
nothing else they were obliged to make all this fine craftwork to sell in order to make 
ends meet. There is evidence to support an opposing view (Warnier, 1975). Early 
reports from the western Bamenda Plateau talk of the chiefdoms of the Ndop Plain in 
terms of great wealth. Administrative reports suggest that there were on average twice 
as many people per compound unit than in the very much larger chiefdom of Nso’ to 
the east of the Plain (Anon., 1929).  
 
The small chiefdoms of the northern Ndop Plain were no smaller than individual 
settlements anywhere else apart from Fumban. They were fiercely independent both 
from each other and from the larger neighbours that surrounded them. Chiefs engaged 
in more or less continuous bouts of exchanges with other chiefs that had dimensions 
of competition and alliance. In their production of high-value, low-unit-volume items 
of material culture, that incorporated powerful immaterial forces of transformation, 
chiefdoms at the heart of the Grassfields were extremely powerful in terms of local 
cosmologies (Fowler, 1990).  
 
This is the nature of competition for regional power here; it has little to do with 
population size or military clout. The intense competition between chiefdoms was 
mainly not warlike but centred on the competitive exchange of materials and objects. 
People also entered this arena of competitive exchange, and recent research points up 
the highly composite nature of their populations. There were winners and losers in 
this ongoing regional game for power. The multiplicity of political sets in the 
Grassfields may be viewed less as a result of fragmentation by external forces and 
more as a result of local processes of competition for people and other resources.  
 
The Problematic Tikar: Questions for History and Ethnography 
 
The issue of the Tikar origin claimed at one time by many of the kingdoms of the 
Bamenda Grassfields provides the perfect case with which to introduce a collection of 
essays that celebrate the work of E.M. Chilver. Each of these essays concerns a 
different aspect of the relationship between history and anthropology, taking 
Cameroon as the case in point. History is illuminated by, and in much of Africa 
cannot be practised without appreciation of, the methods of anthropological fieldwork. 
So too, ethnography is enriched and enabled by the depth and awareness of change 
that is comes from a historical perspective.  
 
What has become known as the ‘Tikar Problem’ has been raised (Jeffreys, 1964), 
allegedly solved (Chilver & Kaberry 1971; Price, 1979) and yet it will not go away 
(Mohammadou, 1990). The problem has to do with the construction of identity in the 
colonial period and the regalisation of chieftaincy. This constructed royal or 
‘Tikarised’ identity retains limited currency in local contemporary dynastic contexts 
and in some western academic discourses, particularly art-history and museological 
studies. It has also been subject to a curious reversal in the context of recent political 
debate over the future of the post-colonial state (Fowler, forthcoming). Hence, this 
problem is a useful exemplar of the collaborative nature of the production of 
knowledge and construction of identity, and also of the incorporation of academic or 
historical knowledge in contemporary political conflict.  
 
What then is the Tikar problem? At its crudest it may be presented as follows: many 
Grassfields dynasties claim Tikar descent, yet neither the languages spoken nor the 
cultural traditions of the groups concerned bear much relationship to the language and 
culture of the Tikar who presently occupy the Tikar Plain. This situation contrasts 
starkly with the dynastic origins of the intrusive Bali-Chamba chiefdoms (see Fardon, 
below). In Bali-Kumbat, for example, the royal lineage unquestionably originates 
from the Chamba of northern Nigeria and Cameroon. Language lists from the royal 
court clearly reveal that the Samba-Leko language was spoken. Further, some ritual 
continuity can also be demonstrated for Bali-Nyonga (Pradelles, 1995).  
 
The question of Tikar origin, by contrast, rightly deserves the label of ‘problem’. First, 
and perhaps most telling, is the linguistic issue, itself linked to a puzzle (Warnier, 
1979). The puzzle concerns the co-existence of two major groups of Grassfield 
languages, Mbam-Nkam and Western Grassfields, which in their common lexical 
innovations and basic vocabulary counts are closer to each other than to any of their 
neighbours. However, the evidence from innovations in noun classes gives a different 
picture; on this basis Mbam-Nkam would be included in Bantu, but Western 
Grassfields would not be so easily placed. In other words the lexical and grammatical 
evidence is contradictory. One hypothesis is that the Bantu Mbam-Nkam moved into 
the region splitting the Western Grassfields language group from their grammatic 
cousins, and that intense interaction between Mbam-Nkam and Western Grassfields 
led to a relexification of both language groups; hence the puzzle. According to what 
we know of the intensity of exchange and contact between Grassfields groups (see 
above) this is not an implausible solution. The intensity and long-term nature of this 
situation is highly relevant to the Tikar problem.  
 
Whatever view is taken of the set of Grassfields languages, it is an inescapable 
conclusion that they are distinct from the language spoken by the Tikar of the Tikar 
Plain, the ‘true’ Tikar. Price makes the point that, although ‘following the 1953 
census, the Tikar were regarded as the largest ethnic group in the former Bamenda 
Province’, (McCullogh, Littlewood and Dugast 1954: 11) ‘there is no linguistic, 
ethnic or truly historical evidence that justifies using the term “Tikar” in relation to 
any of the Grassfields peoples’ (1979: 89).  
 
There are in fact two questions at stake here, and failure to distinguish between them 
has been the main cause of the persistence of the problem in the literature. Question 
one: how should we explain the Grassfields polities’ claim to a Tikar origin? Question 
two: what is the origin of the Tikar people themselves? Recall that we term ‘Tikar’ 
only those who speak the Tikar language, and the separation between the two 
questions is prima facie absolute, in theory if not in practice.  
 
We have briefly summarised the argument in light of Eldridge Mohammadou’s recent 
work which raises once again the issue of Tikar origins for the political formations of 
the Grassfields. This is far more than mere origin fetishism. It is a live political issue 
with great currency today, just as it had a quarter of a century ago when Chilver and 
Kaberry found themselves confronted with origin claims that were both relatively new 
and unsubstantiated, indeed contradicted, by the available evidence. At that time the 
key political question centred on the political trajectory of that section of the former 
German colony, Kamerun, which was administered by Britain. The question then was 
whether the British Cameroons would remain effectively under Nigeria or enter into a 
process of ‘reunification’ with that part of Kamerun that had been administered by 
France (see discussion in Paideuma 1995). The Tikar live immediately across this 
colonial divide, in the French section of Cameroun. Before considering in more detail 
why Grassfields rulers claim linguistically and culturally unlikely Tikar origins, let us 
look briefly at the more recent work of Eldridge Mohammadou which, albeit from 
different perspectives, reaches much the same conclusion.  
 
Eldridge Mohammadou has devoted many years of research to the oral traditions of 
local groups in the ‘middle belt’ of Cameroon. His work constitutes an unparalleled 
survey of historical traditions through a wide, and largely undocumented swathe of 
central Cameroon. Eldridge Mohammadou has been conscientious and systematic: we 
know whom he interviewed, when and where. This allows us to be critical of the 
results and we must emphasise how much it is to his credit that we are able to do so. 
For what he presents is a set of official histories by those holding power in the 
Cameroon of the 1970s and 1980s. While these are not all warrant chiefs (Afigbo, 
1979) or their French equivalents, there is little doubt that some contemporary holders 
of traditional posts do so by warrant of the French administration and their successors 
(the best documented case is probably Geschiere [1980 and 1982]on the Maka chiefs 
further south in the forest zone ). These chiefs are particularly keen to legitimate their 
positions by reference to history and the weight of tradition.  
 
The historical impulse, widespread in this area, that has received a century of 
encouragement from colonial and post-colonial administrators and researchers, is to 
account for identities (however fragile, shifting and situationally defined) in terms of 
historical origins. These origins are usually elsewhere. The autochthones appear to 
have received short shrift in the received accounts. Just what is being explained is 
rarely questioned. To say ‘we come from xx’ where ‘xx’ may be nearby, or as far 
away as Palestine in some celebrated local accounts, is to make a complex claim that 
may mean different things to different people. As such Eldridge Mohammadou 
reproduces political discourse without analysing the varieties and purposes to which it 
is put. Colonial officers conducted historical research with a view to establishing 
hierarchies of chiefs and structures of tax collection. The effective power of a village 
head could be radically altered by convincing an administrative officer that a 
neighbouring village was descended from a sister of his founding ancestor. What the 
population outside the royal palaces thought was rarely asked, and it was not 
important in any case.  
 
The mere concept of subaltern studies changes this. One of the ways in which 
progress has been made is that we are far more sensitive to the political significance 
of narratives be they our own or those we report (and, according to some, expropriate). 
As anthropologists we are committed both to the multiple voices and varying 
narratives of the people with whom we work, and to the academies within which a 
large part of our audience is found.  
 
Hence we are led to ask what function does a claim of Tikar origin have in a 
Grassfields kingdom? First of all it does very little for most of the population that owe 
allegiance in some form or other to the Fon in question. Yet for the Fon the claim 
leads to being one of the major players in the political arena, or at least to be as 
worthy. Grassfields claims to Tikar origins are dynastic claims both in the sense of 
descent ties with Tikar kings, but also in that these claims are made by Grassfields 
chiefs in Grassfields palaces to outsiders addressing themselves to chiefdom-wide 
issues through the chief and council.  
 
Hence, a claim to Tikar dynastic origin may also be a claim to the qualities of 
kingship attributed to Tikar kings. The Tikar remain poorly documented. Apart from 
the early publications of Thorbecke we have the field research of David Price in the 
1970s but unfortunately relatively little of this has been published to date. Enough is 
known, however, to be clear that Tikar society as described by Thorbecke (1914-24) 
and Price (1979, 1985, 1987) is not a Grassfields society. For Price the distinguishing 
feature of Tikar political organisation is the very high degree of concentration of 
powers in the king who had the power of life and death over his subjects. He sees the 
Tikar king as a truly sacred form of kingship. The king selected his six senior 
councillors and they might not overrule him; he could not be dethroned as there was 
no formal mechanism to do so. Unlike the Grassfields case the regulatory association 
of the Tikar could not act against the king but was a straightforward executive branch 
of government under his control. Accordingly, although political and ritual 
institutions of the Tikar appear to parallel ‘similar sounding descriptive titles’ in the 
literature on the Grassfields a very major difference lay in the nature of the king. 
Hence it is not insignificant that claims to Tikar origin were made by Grassfields 
chiefs and paramounts certainly not unaware of the quite different dimensions of a 
sacred and absolutist Tikar kingship. The latter almost certainly represents a pole to 
which the Fons were strongly attracted.  
 
The regalisation of Grassfields chieftaincy is expressed in terms of an increasing 
separation of individuals and groups on the basis of presumed powers of agency 
(largely mystical in our terms) recast in the imported European binaries of royal and 
commoner. This works alongside a complimentary restriction on the expressive use of 
objects (precisely those collectibles that adorn our museum cabinets) to allow for the 
creation of a new class of beings (‘Fons’), with shared characteristics that are bounded 
in time and space. Collective dynastic origins are thus projected both backwards in 
time and outwards in space.  
 
The exercise of contrasting the geographical spread of such dynastic claims with the 
total picture of claims to origins of individual patrilineages that make up individual 
chiefdoms reveals a very interesting scenario. It appears that the regional pattern of 
dynastic claims to origin mirrors the diverse composition of the individual 
communities. If we introduce language into this equation a very important point 
emerges. Common claims to dynastic Tikar origins cross-cut internal Grassfield 
linguistic groupings and bear no significant relationship with languages present on the 
Tikar Plain. Yet claims to diverse origins in the composition of the general population 
have very real expression in terms of multilingualism, trade, exchange and marriage 
relationships with chiefdoms of origin.  
 
Real, imagined or, perhaps transformations of some other principle or relationship, 
such common dynastic claims have been picked up quite uncritically by art-historians 
such as Northern (1973) and raised up to the level of tribal groupings into which local 
forms and styles of art-working can be bound up for expositional purposes. In some 
ways this is an advance over the earlier efforts of collectors and documenters of local 
material culture who often erroneously conflated point of acquisition with provenance. 
A good example of this is the chiefdom of Bali-Nyonga. The material upon which 
Bali’s earlier false reputation as a centre of artistic excellence was based came largely 
from the central zone of the Grassfields, from Kom, Babanki, Oku and the Ndop Plain. 
By the 1970s these real centres of production have long since 8 been recognised as 
such. Yet they are still referred to in some of the literature as the so-called Bamenda-
Tikar (see e.g., Northern 1984). Part of the complexity confronting visitors to the area 
is that some local cognoscenti who have had feedback from the literature may well 
articulate such claims. However, any such claim can really only be based on an 
uncritical reading of the existing literature.  
 
In fact the Bamenda part of this nomenclature derives from a very small chiefdom, 
called Mandankwe, quite near Bali where the Germans built a fort and set up an 
administrative station around 1902. From this point on the region administered from 
here becomes known as Bamenda. The Tikar element of this curious tribal 
nomenclature reflects what has been outlined above regarding common dynastic 
claims to origins. In other words inclusion in this group does not follow linguistic 
lines, nor do the languages of the Grassfields chiefdoms claiming Tikar origins bear 
any meaningful relationship to that of the actual Tikar, a relatively small group living 
either side of the Mbam river. It is worth pointing out that the art of the Tikar is scarce 
and little known by comparison with the arts of the Grassfields chiefdoms that this 
version of history would have them to have spawned.  
 
We can read this in two ways. Firstly, these claims only appear in the administrative 
records of the 1920s in the historical context of a new and British colonial regime 
seeking to establish some form of effective administration. Hence, this may constitute 
a specific form of representation to that nascent colonial administration by individual 
communities as associational groups of relatively equal value. However, there is a 
wider context - that of the partition of the former colony of Kamerun, and just as in 
Europe post-Yalta, the political debate did not cease. The Tikar lie to the east in the 
francophone region. Hence, claims to Tikar origins may reflect a desire to reject 
incorporation into Nigeria.  
 
There may, of course, be a material kernel from which such claims have been 
elaborated. Bamum, the largest Grassfields chiefdom claims dynastic links with the 
Tikar, and borders the Tikar area with which it maintains some ritual ties. Geary 
(1983a) recounts Bamum traditions that up until the reign of an early Bamum chief 
the material symbols of the chieftaincy - especially the double-gongs and other iron 
sacra came from the east, from the Tikar area rather than the centre of the Grassfields 
as was the case in more recent times. So, in one sense, powerful objects of material 
culture may well come to ‘transmit’ identity independent of movement of peoples 
although it may be represented as the latter rather than the former.  
 
Bamum had become a major regional power by the end of the first quarter of the 
nineteenth century with an absolutist monarchy firmly established at the time of 
German contact in 1902 (Tardits, 1980). The Bamum, like their neighbours the Nso’ 
and some others, recognise the ‘ritual’ ascendancy of the chief of Bankim. New 
paramounts must be blessed at Rifum, a sacred lake near Bankim, and during these 
rites only the chief of Bankim sits on a stool. To sit on the ground in his presence is a 
clear symbol of subservience. Such ritual power does not correspond to political 
power, and, has not done so this century, and we can say with some confidence for 
last century also. Such conundrums do not mean in any simple sense that the Bamum, 
or the Nso’ are Tikar or come from Bankim. There may be parallels with the origin 
claims made for North American identity. We do not know how many Americans 
claim to be descended from the passengers on the Mayflower, but one suspects that it 
is a demographic impossibility (one that parallels the total number of fragments of the 
True Cross to be found in churches throughout Europe).  
 
We are ethnographers. Our strength lies in detailed knowledge of areas that are tiny 
by comparison with the span encompassed by Eldridge Mohammadou’s survey (1990 
and 1991). What our detailed knowledge reveals are some of the complexities that any 
survey must miss by its very nature. To take but one example from the history of the 
Mambila on the Tikar Plain - if one talks to the heads of the hamlets that fall within 
the authority of the major villages, one receives a very different history from that 
obtained in the central palaces of those villages. Mambila immigration onto the Tikar 
plain appears to occurred in several waves, each one conquering less of the Tikar than 
those Mambila that preceded them. A historical text tha
Duabang hamlet has already been published (Zeitlyn, 1992). The degree of 
complexity of the problems of local population shifts and the changing patterns of 
political allegiance, let alone political structures, is such that it cannot be done justice 
by a broad picture of invaders from the north who sweep in on horseback and change 
all those that they touch.  
 
What Eldridge Mohammadou argues, in essence, is that not the bulk of the population 
but the ruling Grassfields dynasties come, in some sense, from Bankim. Why else 
would their coronations have to be confirmed at the sacred lake outside Bankim? Let 
us push this argument to its logical extreme and consider the following scenario. Were 
it the case that some hypothetical Grassfields paramount should claim a European 
dynastic origin, would then the necessity to register the succession with the post-
colonial administration (itself ultimately of European colonial origin) similarly 
confirm the claim? To describe the Bankim rite as ‘confirmation of coronation’ may 
be misleading and perhaps ‘endorsement’ is a more useful way of describing what is 
going on. Certainly we have no reason to preclude the existence of various ritual ties 
between some Tikar kingdoms and some Grassfields groups. For instance, following 
the death in 1913 of the noted Bamum queen-mother, Njapdungke, emissaries were 
sent from Rifum carrying fire and smeared with the white clay of mourning. Jeffreys 
suggests that sacred water from Rifum was also sent at the death of the Bamum king 
(1964). Therefore, such ritual endorsements may take many forms and may also be 
ongoing between paramounts who continue to exchange gifts and to send 
masquerades to each others’ important ritual and ceremonial occasions.  
 
The mutual dependency of Grassfields Fons may reach far deeper even than this - to 
the extent of a neighbouring Fon coming to occupy the stool of the deceased 
paramount until the succession has been assured (Chilver, pers. comm.) - but this is 
not public knowledge and may well be concealed, especially from outsiders. One 
reason that the problem will not go away is that since the Bamum and Nso’ do have a 
visible link with Bankim this serves as a model for other Grassfields groups with 
aspirations to wider political influence. The argument is almost syllogistic in form. 
High-status groups have historical links with Bankim. We are a high-status group, 
therefore we have historical links with Bankim.  
 
Similar processes can be documented at work among the Mambila (immediately to 
the north of the Grassfields) where origin accounts which include mention of founders 
coming from ‘The East’ may be re-interpreted as meaning ‘coming from Bankim’. 
For instance, in the 1970s Adda (1975) and Hamman (1975) documented some 
Nigerian Mambila as claiming Tikar origin. They say they come ‘from the East’ from 
Bankim (the centre of the Tikar living on the Tikar Plain) or from ‘Shomi’. Yet one of 
us, as an intermittent resident of Somie (Shomi) for the past ten years, can state with 
some confidence that the population there claims to come from the West, descending 
from the Mambila Plateau in several waves over the last 150-200 years.  
 
The general picture presented by Eldridge Mohammadou is one of Bare-Chamba 
raiding groups mounted on horseback sweeping down from the north in the late 
eighteenth or early nineteenth century, i.e. long before the Fulani raids of the eastern-
most wing of the Sokoto jihad arrived in the area. The subsequent Fulani raids have 
often obliterated memory of the earlier Bare-Chamba raids. These raids are 
considered by Eldridge Mohammadou to have radically changed the political and 
demographic map of north and central Cameroon, pushing local groups on to 
mountain fastnesses or into nucleated polities that were centralised as a defensive 
strategy against the raids. This is the picture presented of the ‘crystallisation’ of the 
Tikar from the more or less acephalous indigenes of the Tikar Plain. Though here it 
proves necessary to introduce the complicating factor of the Mbum. Once the Tikar 
proper were established raiding continued with Bankim as its base. These raids went 
further south into the wider Grassfields, giving rise to what we now recognise as the 
Bamum, Nso’ etc. Our argument with this is in the detail of the final sentence, ‘giving 
rise to’ is deliberately vague. We believe it cannot be fleshed out satisfactorily. 
Similarly Bamum, Nso’ etc. The et cetera is a movable feast.  
 
The problem for Eldridge Mohammadou is that he is either trying to explain too much 
or too little. The high degree of lexical convergence among Grassfield languages 
implies that they have been spoken in the same area for a long time, far longer than 
the few centuries covered by Eldridge Mohammadou’s reconstruction. Thus he cannot 
claim to be accounting for the origins of the languages spoken in the area. Along with 
language we could include a greater or lesser amount of ‘cultural baggage’, but we 
leave that argument for another place. What he could still claim to be describing is the 
origin of the main institutions of the main polities. Although this is a far lesser claim 
it is itself weakened by the evidence of Tikar ethnography. Eldridge Mohammadou’s 
raiders seem to have carried little with them, and, especially by contrast to the 
Chamba that established Grassfields Bali chiefdoms, left little behind them. The best 
comparison does seem to be that of the Lumbee of the United States (Blu, 1980): the 
Grassfields ‘Tikar’ are the Lumbee of Cameroon - they are united by an assertion of 
identity that is its own warrant!  
 
In 1971 Chilver and Kaberry themselves considered the issue of claims to Tikar origin 
as a Malinoswkian charter, as a political statement legitimising sacred kingship. In 
seeking legitimacy there is implied both a claim for validation as well as a claim to 
certain qualities of kingship or chieftaincy and the context in which it is manifested.  
 
It is the case, as we have noted, that both Tikar kingship and its social and cultural 
context differs markedly from its Grassfields neighbours. Price states that ‘there is a 
high degree of cultural homogeneity amongst the six Tikar kingdoms. They share 
similar institutions. They are quite distinct from their neighbours. They speak one 
language...’ (1979: 91) None of these characteristics are easily applied to Grassfields 
chiefdoms which are to a much greater extent linguistically and culturally 
heterogeneous. It is perhaps not insignificant that the Tikar strongly exhibit the 
characteristics of ‘tribe’, i.e., they speak one language, share common culture 
characteristics that mark them off from their neighbours. Fardon (1987) has proposed 
that ethnic identity as a universal class of difference is not necessarily present until it 
is learnt or introduced. May we extend our reading of Grassfields claims to Tikar 
origin as a response to the introduction of ideas to do with tribe, bounded identity and 
so on? In other words the Tikar present a model ‘tribe’ and the Grassfields chiefdoms 
seek to emulate this condition by claiming a dynastic link or origin from them. This, 
of course, begs the question why the Tikar should have achieved, or be perceived to 
have reached, the status of tribe or discrete ethnic identity. One clue may be the many 
mentions in early exploration literature of the Tikar from a northern perspective. 
These include accounts of brave and successful resistance by Tikar kingdoms, such as 
the Ngambe, against Fulani sieges. It seems plausible that the Tikar may have acted as 
both buffer and intermediary between northern and Grassfields groups during the 
course of the nineteenth century. In this respect we may concur with the thread of 
Eldridge Mohammadou’s argument that stresses the significance of the role played by 
Tikar groups as intermediaries between Grassfields and northern polities.  
 
